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Abstract
A monopolist introduces a new product of either low or high quality.
It advertises to make consumers aware of the product and signals product
quality using both price and advertising. When consumption does not re-
veal product quality, price is higher and advertising is lower than they would
be if product quality is observable. Price rises and advertising falls as the
fraction of aware consumers increases. When consumption reveals product
quality, price is higher and advertising is lower than they would be if prod-
uct quality is observable. Price declines as the fraction of aware consumers
increases and advertising follows an inverted U shape. We find support for
these empirical predictions from a data set on Direct-to-Consumer advertis-
ing on pharmaceutical drugs.
JEL: D82, L15, M37
Keywords: Quality, Signaling, Pricing, Advertising
1 Introduction
When a firm introduces a new product, it advertises to make consumers aware of
the product and signals product quality using both price and advertising. Over
time, as information about the product diffuses, more and more consumers become
aware of the product. This paper examines the impact of increasing product
awareness on advertising and on price. We study this issue in a static model under
two kinds of information environments. For products like fire alarms and hair loss
drugs, product quality is not easily verified since consumption is a highly imperfect
signal of product quality. In these cases, consumers who are aware of the product
remain uninformed about product quality. Hence, the value of signaling increases
as more consumers become aware of the product. For other products like anti-
histamine drugs and CD players, consumption reveals product quality. In these
cases, there are likely to be three kinds of consumers: informed consumers who are
1I would like to thank Kenneth Hendricks for his input and advice, Max Stinchcombe, Randal
Watson, Thomas Wiseman, Eugenio Miravete, Mihkel Tombak, and Paul Heidhues for their
helpful comments. All errors are mine. Department of Economics, The University of Western
Ontario, Social Science Centre, Room 4086 London, Ontario CANADA N6A 5C2; Phone: 519-
661-2111; Ext: 85276; E-mail:mayar@uwo.ca.
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aware of the product and know its quality, uninformed consumers who are aware of
the product but do not know its quality, and unaware consumers who do not know
about the product. We model this situation by assuming that consumers who are
aware of the product at the beginning of the period are informed, but consumers
who learn about the product from advertising during the period are uninformed.
In this case, the value of signaling declines as more consumers become aware of
the product and are informed.
In characterizing the predictions of the signaling model, we focus on the unique
separating equilibrium that survives the Intuitive Criterion of Cho and Kreps
(1987). In most cases, this is also the unique equilibrium. Our main findings are
as follows. When product awareness does not lead to knowledge of product qual-
ity, price is higher and advertising is lower than they would be if product quality
is observable and, as the fraction of aware consumers increases, price rises and
advertising decreases. Thus, the distortion on price gets larger and the distortion
on advertising gets smaller. When awareness leads to knowledge of product qual-
ity, price is higher and advertising is lower than they would be if product quality
is observable. As the fraction of aware consumers increases, price declines and
advertising follows an inverted U shape. Thus, the distortion on both price and
advertising decreases as more consumers become aware and informed. We find
support for these empirical implications from a data set on Direct-to-Consumer
advertising on pharmaceutical drugs. After being approved by the FDA in Decem-
ber 1997, annual advertising for the hair loss prescription drug, Propecia, declined
over the period 1998 to 2002. On the other hand, annual advertising for Singulair,
an allergy prescription drug, over the same period follows an inverted U shape.
There is a voluminous theoretical literature on price and/or advertising as
signals of product quality. The seminal paper is by Nelson (1974) and an excellent
review of the literature can be found in Bagwell (2005). Cooper and Ross (1984),
Bagwell and Riordan (1991), and Linnemer (2002) study signaling models in which
all consumers are aware of the product but not all are informed about the quality
of the product. Consequently, advertising can signal but not inform. Bagwell and
Riordan show that the high quality firm will distort price upward and that the price
will decline with the fraction of informed consumers. Linnemer allows the firm to
use advertising as well as price to signal quality and characterizes conditions under
which the firm will engage in dissipative advertising. He argues that advertising
is zero during introductory and mature phases of the product cycle, but positive
during the expansion phase. Our main contribution to this strand of the literature
is to give advertising a positive role in making consumers aware of the product
and to examine how price and advertising will change as more consumer become
aware of the product.
Overgaard (1991), Zhao (2000), Orzach et al. (2002), and Bagwell and Over-
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gaard (2005) study signaling models in which advertising enhances demand but
product quality is not observable. In the language of this paper, advertising makes
consumers aware of the product but they remain uninformed. These papers show
that the high quality firm will distort price upward and advertising downward
relative to the case in which product quality is observable. Our contribution to
this literature is the comparative static result that price increases and advertising
decreases with the fraction of aware consumers.
The empirical literature on advertising and product quality has failed to find
a consistent relationship. For example, Caves and Green (1996) find that the
correlation between quality and advertising varies across different markets and
products. When testing the relationship, our model suggests that control should
be made for two key variables: the age of the product and whether consumption
reveals the product quality or not. Horstmann and MacDonald (2003) study data
on advertising and price from the compact disc player market. They find that
price falls at an accelerating pace and that advertising exhibits an inverted U
shape. They were not able to reconcile these results with existing signaling models.
However, the results are consistent with the model developed in this paper under
the assumption that some of the consumers who are aware of the product are also
informed, and that the fraction of informed consumers grows over time.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the basic model.
In Section 3, we study product markets in which consumers may and may not be
aware of the product but are never informed about product quality. We charac-
terize the separating equilibrium and obtain closed form solutions for advertising
and price as functions of the fraction of aware consumers. In Section 4, we study
product markets in which consumers who are aware of the product may also be
informed about product quality. We characterize the separating equilibrium and
solve for the solution numerically. In section 5, we document several advertising
patterns for prescription drugs. Section 6 provides some concluding remarks, while
the proofs are collected in the Appendix.
2 The Model
A monopolist manufactures a new product of uncertain quality. For simplicity, we
will assume that product quality is either high or low: q ∈ {H,L}, H > L. Let
ρ0 denote the ex ante probability of high quality. The monopolist knows product
quality. Production costs of the high (low) quality product are constant and equal
to cH (cL). We impose the following assumptions on product costs and quality: (i)
cH > cL and (ii) cH/H < cL/L. Condition (i) states that high quality product is
more costly to produce and condition (ii) implies that cost per unit of quality is
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lower for the high quality product i.e. efficiency condition.
There is a continuum of consumers for the new product, each with a potential
demand for one unit. A consumer’s utility for a product of quality q is given by
u(q, p) = θq − p
where p is the price of the product. Consumers are differentiated in their willing-
ness to pay which is modelled by assuming θ is uniformly distributed on [0, R]. All
consumers are willing to pay more for the higher quality good.
Some consumers are aware of the product while others are not. Let λ denote
the fraction of consumers who are not aware of the product at the beginning of
a period. The monopolist can increase the fraction of consumers who are aware
of the product by advertising during a period. The probability of an unaware
consumer learning about the product from advertising is given by a/(1+ a) where
a denotes advertising expenditures. Thus, the fraction of potential consumers at
the end of a period is
1− λ+ aλ
1 + a
.
In what follows, we distinguish two kinds of product markets. In the first case,
we assume consumers who are aware of the product do not know its quality. This
situation would apply to a product whose quality is not observable and cannot
be learned, at least not until some time elapses. Examples would include hair-
loss products or fire alarms. In the second case, we assume that the fraction
of consumers who are aware of the product at the beginning of the period (i.e.,
1−λ) also know its quality but that the fraction of consumers who learn about the
product during the period from advertising (i.e., λ a
1+a
) do not know the quality
of the product. This situation would apply to a product like an anti-histamines
drug whose quality is not observable but is quickly learned from experience. We
will refer to consumers who are aware of the product and know its quality as
informed consumers and consumers who are aware of the product and do not
know its quality as uninformed. The key difference between these two cases is in
regard to how the monopolist responds to changes in the value of λ, which will
be decreasing over time. In the first case, decreases in λ reduces the monopolist’s
incentive to advertise but increases its incentive to signal high quality; in the
second case, decreases in λ reduces the monopolist’s incentive to advertise and to
signal quality.
Before analyzing these two cases, it will be useful to characterize the solution
to the model when product quality is observable so all consumers who are aware of
the product are informed. This benchmark case does not imply that all consumers
are aware of the existence of the product, but whoever is aware of the product
knows its quality. In this case, the monopolist who supplies product quality q
chooses price and advertising to maximize
4
Πoq(p, a) =
[
1− λ+ λ a
1 + a
]
(R− p
q
)(p− cq)− a,
where superscript o stands for the fact that product quality is observable. The
high quality monopolist’s (unique) profit-maximizing price is
poH =
RH + cH
2
and advertising expenditure is
aoH =

√
λ(RH−cH)−2
√
H
2
√
H
if λ ∈ (λH , 1]
0 if λ ∈ [0, λH ]
,
where
λH =
(
2
√
H
RH − cH
)2
.
Similarly, the solution for the low quality monopolist is
poL =
RL+ cL
2
and
aoL =

√
λ(RL−cL)−2
√
L
2
√
L
if λ ∈ (λL, 1]
0 if λ ∈ [0, λL]
,
where
λL =
(
2
√
L
RL− cL
)2
.
For each type of monopolist, optimal prices are independent of λ and advertising
levels are nondecreasing in λ.
The following lemma compares the solutions of the high and low quality mo-
nopolists.
Lemma 1: (i) If λ ∈ [λH , 1], then aoH > aoL (ii) poH > poL.
The Lemma states that the high quality monopolist advertises more and charges
a higher price.
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3 Case I: No Informed Consumers
In this section, we study the case where only a fraction of the consumers are aware
of the product and they are not informed. The monopolist uses advertising to
increase the fraction of potential consumers. The high quality monopolist wants
to distinguish itself from the low quality monopolist and can use both advertising
and price to do so.
Let the consumer assessment of the probability that the quality is H after ob-
serving some price and advertising pair, (p, a), be denoted by ρ(p, a) ∈ [0, 1]. How
consumers make the inference requires an explanation at this point. First, as it
is widely assumed in signaling literature, an unaware consumer who receives an
advertisement observes all advertising spending2. Second, all aware consumers can
observe advertising spending and price. Similarly, in Milgrom and Robert (1986),
all consumers are aware of the product and they all observe advertising spending
and price. With these assumptions, consumers who become aware of the product
observe the firm’s total advertising spending and price; thus, they hold the same
inferences about the firm’s quality, ρ(p, a). The payoff of the monopolist who sup-
plies quality q and chooses (p, a) is
Πq(p, a; ρ) = D(p, a; ρ)(p− cq)− a,
where
D(p, a; ρ) =
[
1− λ+ λ a
1 + a
]
(R− p
ρH + (1− ρ)L).
Two observations are in line at this point. First, the higher the consumer
assessment of the probability that quality is high, the bigger is the payoff of the
monopolist. In other words, for given (p, a), an increase in ρ(p, a) increases the
payoff of each type of monopolist. Hence, the low quality firm has an incentive
to mimic the price and advertising selection of the high quality firm, if this fools
potential costumers. Second, when quality is observable, consumers correctly form
the belief of ρ(p, a) = 1 (ρ(p, a) = 0) for any pair of (p, a) for the high quality firm
(the low quality firm). In case of an information environment where quality is
not observable, we first define our equilibrium concept and present some basic
characteristics of separating equilibria.
A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium is a set of strategies {(pL, aL), (pH , aH)} and
beliefs ρ(p, a), such that: (i) each strategy is optimal given the beliefs (i.e. (pq, aq)
2This assumption enables consumers to make the same inference for the product’s quality.
However, consumers do not have to observe all advertising spending. Only having a positive
correlation between the firm’s total advertising and consumer’s observed advertising would be
qualitatively sufficient.
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maximizes Πq(p, a; ρ(p, a))), and (ii) the beliefs, derived from the equilibrium
strategies, are consistent with Bayes’ rule whenever possible. In a separating equi-
librium, each type plays a different strategy (i.e., (pL, aL) 6= (pH , aH)); hence,
uninformed consumers can infer quality from the strategy of the monopolist (i.e.
ρ(pH , aH) = 1 > 0 = ρ(pL, aL)). In a pooling equilibrium, both types play the
same strategy ( i.e, (pL, aL) = (pH , aH) ); hence, uninformed consumers can infer
nothing from the strategy of the monopolist (i.e., ρ(pH , aH) = ρ(pL, aL) = ρ0)
In a separating equilibrium, the low quality firm is revealed and acts as in
observable quality benchmark case, (poL, a
o
L), and earn the corresponding profit
ΠL(p
o
L, a
o
L; 0) = Π
o
L. Therefore, to separate itself, the high quality firm must
choose a pair (pH , aH) which the low quality firm has no incentive to mimic. Hence,
(pH , aH) is incentive compatible for the low quality firm if
ΠL(pH , aH ; 1) ≤ ΠL(poL, aoL; 0) = ΠoL.
The following lemma shows that the low quality firm has an incentive to mimic
the high quality firm’s observable quality price and advertising pair, (poH , a
o
H), if
this fools potential costumers.
Lemma 2: ΠL(p
o
H , a
o
H ; 1) > ΠL(p
o
L, a
o
L; 0).
Thus, if the high quality firm is to separate, it must distort its selection
(pH , aH), away from the observable quality maximizer, (p
o
H , a
o
H ).
Least-cost separating equilibrium
The only equilibrium outcome that survives Intuitive Criterion of Cho and Kreps
(1987) is so-called least-cost separating outcome. In this equilibrium, the high
quality firm chooses (pH , aH) to solve the following problem:
max
p,a
ΠH(p, a; 1) =
[
1− λ+ λ a
1 + a
]
(R− p
H
)(p− cH)− a
subject to
ΠL(p, a; 1) =
[
1− λ+ λ a
1 + a
]
(R− p
H
)(p− cL)− a ≤ ΠoL
where
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ΠoL =

(RL−2√L−cL)2
4L
+ (1−
√
λ)(RL−cL)√
L
if λ ∈ (λL, 1]
(RL−cL)2
4L
if λ ∈ [0, λL]
.
The following propositions and corollaries characterize the solution to the high
quality firm’s maximization problem.
Proposition 1. In the unique separating equilibrium that satisfies the Intuitive
Criteria, (psL, a
s
L) = (p
o
L, a
o
L) and
(psH , a
s
H) =

( (RH+cL)
√
λ+
√
∆
2
√
λ
, [
√
λ(RH−cL)−2
√
H]−√∆
2
√
H
) if λ ∈ (λK , 1]
(RH+cL+
√
∆1
2
, 0) if λ ∈ (λL, λK ]
(RH+cL
2
+
√
(R2HL−cL2)(H−L)
4L
, 0) if λ ∈ [0, λL]
where λK=max{λ : asH(λ) = 0}, and λK > λL.
In the separating equilibrium, denoted by superscript s, the high quality mo-
nopolist employs advertising and/or price to separate itself depending on the frac-
tion of unaware consumers. In the first region, the fraction of unaware consumers
is high enough, (i.e., λ ∈ (λK , 1]), that the high quality monopolist efficiently uses
both advertising and price to separate itself. In the second region, the fraction
of unaware consumers is in an intermediate range (i.e., λ ∈ (λL, λK ]) so that the
monopolist uses only price to separate. In the third region, the fraction of un-
aware consumers is so low that the monopolist charges a fixed price and does not
advertise at all. In what follows, we explain the characteristics and the underlying
intuition of the separating equilibrium as the fraction of aware consumers changes.
Corollary 1. psH is strictly decreasing in λ and greater than p
o
H .
The high quality monopolist distorts price above monopoly price and distortion
decreases with λ. Why does the high quality firm distort price upward? The answer
can be seen by considering the mimicry incentive for the low quality firm. The low
quality firm has a lower marginal cost and would like to set a price lower than poH
when consumers believe that it is of the high quality. Hence, in order to decrease
mimicry incentive of the low quality, the distortion in price should be an increase
from poH . When consumers who are aware of the product remain uninformed about
product quality, the value of signaling decreases with λ, which in turn decreases
price distortion.
Corollary 2. (i) If λ > λK, then a
s
H is strictly increasing (ii) If λ > λL, then
asH < a
o
L.
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The advertising is lower than it would be if product quality is observable and
it falls as the fraction of aware consumers increases. More interestingly, the high
quality firm advertises less than the low quality firm in the least-cost separating
equilibrium. From Lemma 1, remember that when quality is observable, the high
quality firm advertises more than the low quality firm. Why does low advertising
expenditure signal product quality? When believed as the the high quality firm,
the low quality firm enjoys an increase in profit margin since it can charge a higher
price. Then the mimicry incentive of the low quality firm is to expand the market
by increasing advertising. By doing this, the low quality firm takes advantage of
high profit margin. As a result, the distortion should be a decrease in advertising
not an increase. Moreover, advertising falls as the fraction of aware consumers
increases for two reasons. First, the need for informative advertising decreases as
the fraction of aware consumers increases. Second, the marginal cost of advertising
is the same while the marginal benefit of advertising decreases as the fraction
of aware consumers increases. Therefore, price becomes a more efficient signal
compared to advertising, which in turn results in further decrease in advertising.
Finally, in the Proposition 1, consider the region where λ ∈ [0, λL). Why does
the high quality firm set a constant high price and advertise at zero level? In
this region, the marginal benefit of advertising is less than its marginal cost since
the fraction of unaware consumers is so small. Hence, advertising expenditure is
dissipative and can only be used as money burning. It turns out that price is a
more efficient signal for the high quality firm compared to dissipative advertising.
The cost of money burning is the same for both types of the monopolist while
decreasing demand through price hurts the low quality monopolist more due to its
higher price margin. That is why, higher quality product does not advertise and
charges high and constant price.
Existence of the separating equilibrium
The least-cost separating equilibrium exists, when the high quality firm prefer the
equilibrium pair of advertising and price (asH , p
s
H) to any other choice of advertising
and price where it is mistakenly considered as the low quality firm, that is,
ΠH(p
s
H , a
s
H ; 1) ≥ max
p,a
ΠH(p, a; 0).
The following proposition characterizes conditions under which the separating
equilibrium exists.
Proposition 2. A separating equilibrium satisfying the Intuitive Criterion exists
if (i)(H-L) is not too small and (ii)R is not too small.
9
3.1 Numerical Example 1:
In this section, we propose a fully specified numerical example that give rise to
above mentioned least-cost separating equilibrium. Assume that R = 10, H =
10, cH = 5, L = 5, and cL = 3 with which it is easy to check that both the
efficiency condition, (cH/H < cL/L ), and the conditions required for the existence
are satisfied.
The following figure presents advertising expenditure pattern when (i) quality
is observable (ii) quality is not observable and aware consumers are uninformed
about product quality. When product quality is not observable, the high quality
firm advertises less than the low quality firm; which in turn implies that there
is a negative relationship between product quality and advertising. Furthermore,
advertising decreases as the fraction of unaware consumers decreases.
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The fraction of unaware consumers (λ)
Ad
ve
rti
sin
g
The Advertising Pattern of the High Quality Monopolist (asH)
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The following figure illustrates the unique least-cost separating equilibrium
price pattern for the high quality firm.
When consumption does not reveal product quality, price rises as the fraction
of unaware consumers decreases.
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4 Case II: Informed Consumers
Consumption reveals product quality for some products like anti-histamine drugs
and CD players. For such products, there are likely to be three kinds of consumers:
informed consumers who are aware of the product and know its quality, uninformed
consumers who are aware of the product but do not know its quality, and unaware
consumers who do not know about the product. We assume that the fraction
of consumers who are aware of the product at the beginning of the period (i.e.,
1 − λ) also know its quality but that the fraction of consumers who learn about
the product during the period from advertising (i.e., aλ
1+a
) do not know the product
quality.
When product quality is observable so all consumers who are aware of the
product are informed, the profit maximizing price and advertising solutions of the
monopolist are characterized in Section 2. To sum up, when quality is observable,
the high quality monopolist advertises more and charges a higher price than the
low quality firm (i.e., aoH > a
o
L and p
o
H > p
o
L).
We now consider the case where quality is not observable. In a separating
equilibrium, the low quality firm is revealed and acts as if quality is observable,
(poL, a
o
L) , and earn the corresponding profit Π
o
L = ΠL(p
o
L, a
o
L; 0). Therefore, to
separate itself, the high quality firm must choose a pair (pH , aH) which the low
quality firm has no incentive to mimic. Hence, the price and advertising pair
(pH , aH) is incentive compatible for the low quality firm if
ΠL(pH , aH ; 1) = λ
a
1 + a
(R− p
H
)(p− cL) + (1− λ)(R− p
L
)(p− cL)− a ≤ ΠoL
11
When some consumers have knowledge of the product’s quality, the LHS of
the inequality represents the low quality firm’s mimicry profit (ΠL(pH , aH ; 1)).
By masquerading as high quality, the low quality monopolist could only deceive
the uninformed consumers, represented by λa
1+a
, but not the informed consumers,
represented by (1− λ). Moreover, since the LHS of the inequality is increasing in
λ, an increase in the fraction of informed consumers decreases the mimicry profit
of the low quality monopolist.
In the separating equilibrium, the high quality firm chooses (pH , aH) to solve
the following problem:
max
p,a
ΠH(p, a; 1) =
[
1− λ+ λ a
1 + a
]
(R− p
H
)(p− cH)− a
subject to
ΠL(p, a; 1) = (1− λ)(R− p
L
)(p− cL) + λ a
1 + a
(R− p
H
)(p− cL)− a ≤ ΠoL
It is not possible to get a closed form solution easily, because the first order
condition with respect to price (advertising) is a nonlinear function of advertising
(price). Instead, in the following proposition, we characterize the properties of the
solution to the high quality firm’s maximization problem.
Proposition 3. In the unique separating equilibrium that satisfies the Intuitive
Criteria, (psiL , a
si
L ) = (p
o
L, a
o
L) and
(i) if λ ∈ (λI , 1], then asiH < aoH with d(a
o
H−asiH)
dλ
> 0 and
psiH > p
o
H with
dpsiH
dλ
> 0.
(ii) if λ ∈ [0, λI ], then (psiH , asiH) = (poH , aoH).
The intuition goes as follows. As the fraction of informed consumers increases,
it becomes more costly for the low quality firm to masquerade as the high quality
firm. Thus, it is optimal for the high quality firm to decrease the distortion in both
price and advertising. When the fraction of informed consumers reaches a certain
threshold, the high quality firm is able to charge its observable quality price and
advertising pair while the low quality firm does not mimic and acts as if quality is
observable.
Existence of the separating equilibrium
The least-cost separating equilibrium exists, when the high quality firm prefer the
12
equilibrium pair of advertising and price (asiH , p
si
H) to any other choice of advertising
and price where it is mistakenly considered as the low quality firm, that is,
ΠH(p
si
H , a
si
H ; 1) ≥ max
p,a
ΠH(p, a; 0).
The following proposition characterizes conditions under which the separating
equilibrium exists.
Proposition 4. A separating equilibrium satisfying the Intuitive Criterion exists
if (i)(H-L) is not too small and (ii)R is not too small.
The following section numerically solves the high quality firm’s maximization
problem and characterizes the separating equilibrium price and advertising levels,
(psiH , a
si
H) and (p
si
L , a
si
L ) = (p
o
L, a
o
L), where superscript si stands for separating when
some consumers are informed.
4.1 Numerical Example 2:
We assume the same parametrization as in the numerical example of previous sec-
tion i.e., that R = 10, H = 10, cH = 5, L = 5, and cL = 3. When awareness
leads to knowledge of product quality, the following graph illustrates the advertis-
ing pattern of the high quality, (psiH , a
si
H), and the low quality firm, (p
o
L, a
o
L) in the
separating equilibrium.
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Advertising is lower than it would be if product quality is observable. As the
fraction of informed consumers increases, advertising follows an inverted U shape.
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The advertising of the high quality monopolist (i.e., asiH) first increases, but at a
decreasing rate and then turns downward and converges to its observable quality
advertising level (i.e., aoH). More importantly, as more consumers become aware
and informed, the distortion in advertising decreases. The reason is simple. As
the fraction of informed consumers increases, it becomes more costly for the low
quality monopolist to signal a high quality falsely to uninformed consumers. As
a result, the high quality monopolist can signal quality with a smaller advertising
distortion.
From an empirical perspective, the quality-advertising correlation is generally
weak in the early ages of the product, but it becomes stronger as the product
matures. The experience with the product could affect not only the magnitude,
but also the sign of the quality-advertising correlation. Tentatively, this may also
explain the finding of an ambiguous correlation between advertising and quality
in Caves and Greene (1996). Since they consider a cross-section of industries and
do not account for experience with the product, it is likely that some products are
in their early ages and the quality is signaled by modest advertising, while other
products are in mature ages and the quality is signaled by extensive advertising.
In testing the quality-advertising correlation, one has to control for the age of the
product.
When awareness leads to knowledge of product quality, the following graph
presents the price pattern in the separating equilibrium.
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Price is higher than it would be if product quality is observable. The intu-
ition is as follows. A low quality monopolist would lose more sales from informed
consumers by charging a high price; hence, uninformed consumers rationally infer
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higher quality from the higher price. As the fraction of aware consumers increases,
price falls and converges to observable quality price. As more consumers become
aware and informed, distortion in price decreases because it becomes more costly
for the low quality monopolist to mimic a high quality and fool uninformed con-
sumers.
Horstmann and MacDonald (2003) analyze a data set on advertising and price
from the compact disc player market and find that advertising follows an inverted
U shape and that price falls at an accelerating pace. They were not able to explain
these results with existing signaling models while their results are consistent with
the model developed in this paper.
5 Empirical Predictions
Some stylized facts on variation in advertising expenditure patterns can be found
in a data set on Direct-to-Consumer advertising on pharmaceutical drugs. Direct
to Consumer Advertising (DTCA) expenditure, obtained from TNS Media Intelli-
gence, consists of individual brand-name drugs. TNS Media Intelligence monitors
advertising expenditures for various media such as radio, newspaper, magazine,
and TV. Their database includes all advertising expenditures for prescription drugs
that appears in these media. We have total monthly advertising expenditure from
1996 to 2002. The FDA’s Orange Book is used for each drug’s approval date. We
find some evidence that the advertising expenditure pattern differs for individ-
ual prescription drugs and seems to be affected by whether consumption reveals
product quality or not.
The FDA approved Propecia, a hair loss prescription drug 3, in December 1997.
Propecia is an example of a good for which consumption does not reveal product
quality easily. Our model predicts that advertising decreases over the entire life
cycle of the product. Figure 1 presents annual average advertising expenditures
for Propecia, which is consistent with the empirical prediction of our model.
In contrast, Singulair, an allergy relief prescription drug, was approved by the
FDA in February 1998. The average annual advertising pattern of Singulair is
illustrated in the following figure 2. Consumption of Singulair is likely to reveal
its quality. If the fraction of informed consumers grows over time, our model
predicts that the advertising takes an inverted U shape, which is consistent with
the advertising pattern of Singulair.
3From Merck’s webpage“Propecia was developed to treat mild to moderate male pattern hair
loss ...Remembering to take your pill each day is important...Most men see results 3 to 12 months
after starting Propecia...If Propecia has not worked within 12 months, further treatment is not
likely to help.”
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At this point, the demonstration of average advertising expenditure pattern
for a pool of prescription drugs would be an informative exercise. We consider
the drugs which have approval dates between 1996 and 1998 and have stayed in
the market for at least five years. In most of the cases, the approval date and the
launch dates of the products coincide while a few have only a small difference. To
calculate the age of the drug, we consider the approval date as a launch date of
the drug. There are 25 brand-name drugs in this category. Figure 3 summarizes
the average monthly advertising level of these drugs as a function of age of the
drug.
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Figure 3:
Significant variation in advertising spending exists among prescription drugs
and whether consumption reveals the product quality or not is a key product
characteristic in explaining the variation. When testing the time series advertising
behavior of experience goods, one should also control for this. With cross-sectional
industry data, one has to be extra careful since it is likely that above mentioned
key product characteristic may vary drastically across different industries.
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6 Conclusion
This paper develops a model that gives advertising a positive role in making con-
sumers aware of the product and examines the impact of increasing product aware-
ness on advertising and on price. It considers two types of information environment
depending on whether product awareness does lead to knowledge of product qual-
ity or not. When product awareness does not lead to knowledge of product quality,
price is higher and advertising is lower than they would be if product quality is
observable and, as the fraction of aware consumers increases, price rises and adver-
tising decreases. When awareness leads to knowledge of product quality, price is
higher and advertising is lower than they would be if product quality is observable.
As the fraction of aware consumers increases, price declines and advertising fol-
lows an inverted U shape. We also find support for these advertising expenditure
patterns from a data set on Direct-to-Consumer advertising on pharmaceutical
drugs.
This paper also identifies two key variables in determining the quality-advertising
relationship: age of the product and whether consumption reveals the quality of
the product or not. From an empirical perspective, to test the quality-advertising
relationship, control should be made for these key variables.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1:
(i) We first show that λL > λH
λL = (
2
√
L
RL− cL )
2 > λH = (
2
√
H
RH − cH )
2
√
L(RH − cH) >
√
H(RL− cL)⇐⇒ H
√
L(R− cH
H
) > L
√
H(R− cL
L
)
In the last inequality, H
√
L > L
√
H is always the case because of the assump-
tion H > L. Also, observe that
(R− cH
H
) > (R− cL
L
)⇐⇒ cL
L
>
cH
H
From the last inequality, we conclude that λL > λH because
cH
H
< cL
L
is the effi-
ciency assumption in this paper.
Now, consider the part (i) of Lemma 1. If λ ∈ (λH , 1], then
aoH > a
o
L ⇐⇒ aoH =
√
λ(RH − cH)− 2
√
H
2
√
H
> aoL =
√
λ(RL− cL)− 2
√
L
2
√
L
2
√
L
√
λ(RH − cH) > 2
√
H
√
λ(RL− cL)⇐⇒
√
L(RH − cH) >
√
H(RL− cL)
H
√
L(R− cH
H
) > L
√
H(R− cL
L
) (1)
We know that H
√
L > L
√
H since H > L. Then, the inequality (??) is
satisfied if
(R− cH
H
) > (R− cL
L
)⇐⇒ H
cH
>
L
cL
The efficiency assumption of cL
L
> cH
H
leads to aoH > a
o
L for all λ ∈ (λH , 1]
(ii)
pcH > p
c
H ⇐⇒ pcH =
RH + cH
2
> pcH =
RL+ cL
2
R(H − L) + cH − cL > 0
where H > L and cH > cL. Therefore, the high quality monopolist charges higher
prices compared to the low quality monopolist.
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Proof of Lemma 2:
Observe first that
ΠL(p
o
H , a; 1) > ΠL(p
o
L, a; 0) for all λ ∈ [0, 1]
ΠL(p
o
H , a; 1) = [
λa
1 + a
+ (1− λ)](RH − cH
2H
)(
RH + cH − 2cL
2
)− a (2)
ΠL(p
o
L, a; 0) = [
λa
1 + a
+ (1− λ)](RL− cL
2L
)(
RL− cL
2
)− a (3)
The payoff in the equation (??) is bigger than the payoff in the equation (??)
if following inequality is satisfied
(
RH − cH
2H
)(
RH + cH − 2cL
2
) > (
RL− cL
2L
)(
RL− cL
2
) (4)
It is always the case that
(
RH + cH − 2cL
2
) > (
RL− cL
2
)⇐⇒ R(H − L) + cH − cL > 0
Moreover, it is also the case that
(
RH − cH
2H
) > (
RL− cL
2L
)⇐⇒ cL
L
>
cH
H
As a result, in the inequality (??) both elements of the right hand side are bigger
than the elements of the left hand side. Consequently, we can conclude that
ΠL(p
o
H , a; 1) > ΠL(p
o
L, a; 0) for all λ ∈ [0, 1]
Now recall from Lemma 1 that if λ ∈ (λH , 1], then aoH > aoL while if λ ∈ [0, λH ],
then aoH = a
o
L = 0
Start with the region where λ ∈ [0, λH ]. Since aoH = aoL = 0 (i.e. they are
equal), the following inequality is the result of first step in this lemma.
ΠL(p
o
H , a
o
H ; 1) > ΠL(p
o
L, a
o
L; 0)
Now, consider the region,λ ∈ (λH , 1]. One can show that ΠL(poH , aoH ; 1) >
ΠL(p
o
L, a
o
L; 0) also holds with a
o
H > a
o
L by the following
dΠL(p
o
H , a; 1)
da
|a=aoH> 0
This last condition means that if the low quality firm can mimic the high quality
firm, it prefers higher level of advertising to aoL (i.e. its profit is higher at a
o
H)
dΠL(p
o
H , a; 1)
da
|a=aoH =
λ
(1 +
√
λ(RH−cH)−2
√
H
2
√
H
)2
(
RH − cH
2H
)(
RH + cH − 2cL
2
)−1 > 0
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After some straightforward calculations, the inequality reduces to the following
(RH − 2cL + cH) > RH − cH ⇐⇒ cH > cL
Thus, the observable quality price and advertising spending (poH , a
o
H) cannot
be a separating equilibrium. Hence, if the high quality firm is to separate, it has
to distort price and/or advertising from (poH , a
o
H). In other words, signaling issue
is relevant.
Proof of Proposition 1:
The Lagrangian for the maximization problem is the following;
Λ = [λ
a
1 + a
+ (1− λ)](R− p
H
)(p− cH)− a]
+µ[ΠoL − [λ
a
1 + a
+ (1− λ)](R− p
H
)(p− cL) + a]
The first order conditions are;
∂Λ
∂p
= [R− 2p
H
+
cH
H
] + µ[R− 2p
H
+
cL
H
] = 0 (5)
∂Λ
∂a
= [
λ
(1 + a)2
(R− p
H
)(p− cH)− 1] + µ[ λ(1 + a)2 (R−
p
H
)(p− cL)− 1] = 0 (6)
∂Λ
∂µ
= ΠoL − [λ
a
1 + a
+ (1− λ)](R− p
H
)(p− cL) + a = 0 (7)
By solving (??) and (??)the optimal level of advertising and price in the equilib-
rium is
a =
√
λ(RH − p)−√H√
H
(8)
In order to find the equilibrium pair of pH and aH , we solve equation (??) and
equation (??). The optimal advertising level, aH , is the solution of the following
equation
√
HaH
2 − [√λ(RH − cL)− 2
√
H]aH − [(1− λ)[
√
λ(RH − cL)− 2
√
H]−√H(1− λ+ aoL)2 − (1− λ)λ
√
H] = 0
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The next step is to find the available roots of this function. The roots are a1H
and a2H where a
1
H < a
2
H . Also, there is a corresponding price p
1
H and p
2
H for each
level of advertising a1H and a
2
H respectively.
It should be shown that (a1H , p
1
H) = (a
s
H , p
s
H) gives higher profit compared to
(a2H , p
2
H) where a
1
H < a
2
H and p
1
H > p
2
H and both (a
1
H , p
1
H) and (a
2
H , p
2
H) yield
the same for a mimicking low quality firm. Basically, it is required to show that
ΠH(a1H , p
1
H ; 1) > ΠH(a
2
H , p
2
H ; 1) when ΠL(a
1
H , p
1
H ; 1) = ΠL(a
2
H , p
2
H ; 1). Then, we
show that (a1H , p
1
H) is the least-cost separating equilibrium or the one survives by
standard refinement (i.e., Cho and Kreps (1987)). Observe that
ΠH(a
1
H , p
1
H ; 1)− ΠH(a2H , p2H ; 1)
= [ΠH(a
1
H , p
1
H ; 1)− ΠH(a2H , p2H ; 1)]− [ΠL(a1H , p1H ; 1)− ΠL(a2H , p2H ; 1)]
= [cH − cL][D(a2H , p2H ; 1)−D(a1H , p1H ; 1)]
Since cH > cL, the high-quality firm gains more at (a
1
H , p
1
H) if demand is lower. It
is easy to show that, however, demand at (a1H , p
1
H) is always lower than demand
at (a2H , p
2
H) since a
1
H < a
2
H and p
1
H > p
2
H . This equilibrium can also be called
least-cost separating equilibrium. The only plausible root is;
asH = a
1
H =
[
√
λ(RH−cL)−2
√
H]−√∆
2
√
H
where ∆ = [
√
λ(RH−cL)−2
√
H]2+4
√
H[(1−λ)[√λ(RH−cL)−2
√
H]−√H(1−λ+aoL)2−(1−λ)λ
√
H]
Then by using the equality psH = RH− (1+a
s
H)
√
H√
λ
, the separating equilibrium price
is;
psH = p
1
H =
(RH+cL)
√
λ+
√
∆
2
√
λ
In case of λ ∈ [λL, λK), aoL is positive in the separating equilibrium with the
profit ΠoL =
(1+aoL−λ)2
λ
− (1− λ) = [(RL−cL)2+4L]−4
√
L
√
λ(RL−cL)
4L
. Then, the incentive
compatibility condition for low-quality firm is satisfied if
(1− λ)(R− p
H
)(p− cL) = ΠoL =
[(RL− cL)2 + 4L]− 4
√
L
√
λ(RL− cL)
4L
(9)
The problem reduces to find price levels psH that satisfies the equation (??).
The only plausible root of this function is
pHs =
RH + cL +
√
∆1
2
where ∆1 = (RH + cL)
2 − 4(RHcL + HΠ
o
L
1−λ ) Now, let’s check the boundary values
of psH at λL and λK . At λ = λL = (
2
√
L
RL−cL )
2, the incentive compatibility condition
(??) reduces to
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(R− pH
H
)(pH − cL) = (RL−cL)24L
It reduces to
psH(λL) = p =
RH+cL
2
+
√
(R2HL−cL2)(H−L)
4L
Next thing to solve is that what would be the value of psH at λK . First, remember
that at λK = max{λ : asH(λ) = 0}
asH =
[
√
λ(RH−cL)−2
√
H]−√∆
2
√
H
= 0
where ∆ = [
√
λ(RH − cL) − 2
√
H]2 − H
L
[
√
λ(RL − cL) − 2
√
L] + 4(1 − λ)√λ√H√L[√L(RH − cL) −√
H(RL− cL)]
By plugging ∆ into asH = 0, we get the following equation:
H(RL−cL)2λK+4LH = 4
√
λK
√
H
√
L[(1−λK)
√
L(RH−cL)+λK
√
H(RL−cL)]
(10)
Now, find the optimal price from the incentive compatibility (??) condition of the
low quality firm
(R− p
H
)(p−cL) = [(RL−cL)
2+4L]−4√L
√
λK(RL−cL)
4L(1−λK) Now, lets use the equation (??)
in incentive compatibility condition. (R− p
H
)(p− cL) =
√
λK [
RH−cL√
H
− RL−cL√
L
]
Then, psH(λK) =
RH+cL
2
+
√
(R2HL−cL2)(H−L)
4L
−H
√
λK [
RH−cL√
H
− RL−cL√
L
]
psH =
RH+cL
2
+
√
(R2HL−cL2)(H−L)−4
√
λK
√
H
√
L[
√
L(RH−cL)−
√
H(RL−cL)]
4L
This last equation is equal to the psH(λK).
In the region of λ ∈ [0, λL], we start with analyzing the case where all consumers
are aware of the product (λ = 0). Consumers consist of only aware-type so that
advertising spending only has the role of dissipative signaling (money burning)
and does not directly enhance demand.
The payoff function of q-quality is
Πq(p, a; ρ) = D(p, a; ρ)(p− cq)− a
The profit maximizing equilibrium price and advertising are poL =
RL+cL
2
and
aoL = 0 for the low-quality firm and p
o
H =
RH+cH
2
and aoH = 0 for the high-quality
firm and the profits are ΠoL =
(RL−cL)2
4L
and ΠoH =
(RH−cH)2
4L
.
In the separating equilibrium, the low-quality firm would play the strategy
(poL, a
o
L) = (
RL+cL
2
, 0). The incentive compatibility condition for the low quality
firm is as follows
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ΠL(p, a; 1) = (R− pH )(p− cL)− a ≤ ΠoL = (RL−cL)
2
4L
(ICL)
(R− p
H
)(p− cL)− (RL−cL)24L ≤ a (ICL)
Then, by using ICL, define a function a(p) as the level of advertising required
to deter imitation by a low quality firm for a given price p. Another way to think
of the advertising decision is asking the question, how much advertising should the
high-quality firm employ just to have the incentive compatibility condition of the
low-quality firm satisfied?
a(p) = max{0, (R− p
H
)(p− cL)− (RL−cL)24L }
It is easy to show that ΠoL =
(RL−cL)2
4L
= ΠL(p; 1) = ΠL(p; 1) < ΠL(p
o
L; 1) <
ΠL(p
o
H ; 1) < ΠL(p
H
L ; 1) where p < p
o
L < p
H
L < p
o
H < p along with the values
p = RH+cL
2
−
√
(R2HL−cL2)(H−L)
4L
poL =
RL+cL
2
pHL =
RH+cL
2
poH =
RH+cH
2
p = RH+cL
2
+
√
(R2HL−cL2)(H−L)
4L
Even under the most favorable beliefs, the low quality firm does not mimic any
price below p and above p since corresponding profit is less than its observable
quality profit. Hence, p /∈ (p, p), advertising spending is not required to ensure
separation. However, given that price is in the region of (p, p), at least an amount
a(p) of advertising has to be spent to deter the mimicry of lower quality. There-
fore, the maximization problem for the high quality firm could be written in the
following form;
max
p,a
ΠH(p, a; 1) =
(RH−p)(p−cH)
H
− a
subject to
(i) a ≥ a(p)
(ii) p ² [p, p]
The firm will choose the lowest possible advertising, a = a(p), to minimize the
cost; then, its profit and the maximization problem reduce to
24
ΠH(p, a; 1) =
(RH−p)(p−cH)
H
− a(p) = (RH−p)(p−cH)
H
− [ (RH−p)(p−cL)
H
− (RL−cL)2
4L
]
max
p,a
ΠH(p, a; 1) =
(cH−cL)p
H
− (cH−cL)RH
H
+ (Rl−cL)
2
4L
subject to
p ² [p, p]
Since the payoff function of the high-quality firm increases in price, it is op-
timal to increase the price to p. Also, for the region p²(0, p)
⋃
(p,∞), the price
itself is enough to ensure separation; therefore, it is again optimal to choose p. To
sum up, higher quality would price at p and does not advertise in the separating
equilibrium.
For λ ∈ (0, λL], the idea of the proof is similar. The low quality firm does not
mimic the high quality.
(1− λ)(R− pH
H
)(pH − cL) = ΠoL = (1− λ) (RL−cL)
2
4L
ICL
Hence, the equilibrium price is psH = p =
RH+cL
2
+
√
(R2HL−cL2)(H−L)
4L
Proof of Corollary ??:
If λ ∈ (λK , 1], the separating equilibrium price is
psH =
(RH + cL)
√
λ+
√
∆
2
√
λ
=
RH + cL
2
+
√
∆
2
√
λ
where ∆ = λ[(RH−cL)
√
L−(RL−cL)
√
H][(RH−cL)
√
L+(RL−cL)
√
H−4√λ√H√L]
L
psH =
RH+cL
2
+
√
λ[(RH−cL)
√
L−(RL−cL)
√
H][(RH−cL)
√
L+(RL−cL)
√
H−4√λ√H√L]
L
2
√
λ
psH =
RH+cL
2
+
√
(RH−cL)
√
L−(RL−cL)
√
H
√
(RH−cL)
√
L+(RL−cL)
√
H−4√λ√H√L
2
√
L
Let’s take the derivative of psH with respect to λ
dpsH
dλ
=
√
(RH−cL)
√
L−(RL−cL)
√
H
2
√
L
1√
(RH−cL)
√
L+(RL−cL)
√
H−4√λ√H√L
−2√H√L√
λ
< 0
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As λ increases, the high quality firm’s price psH decreases.
Now, let’s turn to the second part of the Corollary, psH > p
o
H . The proof of
psH > p
o
H follows immediately from the proof of a
s
H < a
o
H .
asH − aoH = [(RH−cL)
√
λ−2√H]−√∆
2
√
H
− (RH−cH)
√
λ−2√H
2
√
H
asH − aoH = (cH−cL)
√
λ−√∆
2
√
H
All we need is the sign of (cH − cL)
√
λ−√∆; hence, multiplying it with some
other positive expression is not going to affect the sign.
[
√
∆− (cH − cL)
√
λ][
√
∆+ (cH − cL)
√
λ] = ∆− λ(cH − cL)2
sign{∆− λ(cH − cL)2} = −sign{(cH − cL)
√
λ−√∆}
We are interested in the sign of ∆− λ(cH − cL)2
∆− λ(cH − cL)2 = [
√
λ(RH − cL)− 2
√
H]2 + 4
√
H[(1− λ)√λ(RH − cL)−
√
H]
−4H(1− λ+ aoL)2 − 4H(1− λ)λ− λ(cH − cL)2
= [
√
λ(RH − cH)− 2
√
H + (cH − cL)
√
λ]2 + 4
√
H[(1− λ)[√λ(RH − cL)− 2
√
H]
−√H(1− λ+ aoL)2 − (1− λ)λ
√
H]− λ(cH − cL)2
= [
√
λ(RH − cH)− 2
√
H]2 + 2[
√
λ(RH − cH)− 2
√
H](cH − cL)
√
λ
4
√
H[(1− λ)[√λ(RH − cL)− 2
√
H]−√H(1− λ+ aoL)2 − (1− λ)λ
√
H]
Let’s plug aoL into the equation and multiply it by L.
∆− λ(cH − cL)2 = L[
√
λ(RH − cH)− 2
√
H]2 + 2L[
√
λ(RH − cH)− 2
√
H](cH − cL)
√
λ+
4L
√
H[(1− λ)[√λ(RH − cL)− 2
√
H]−√H(1− λ+
√
λ(RL−cL)−2
√
L
2
√
L
)2 − (1− λ)λ√H]
> 4L
√
H(1− λ)[√λ(RH − cL)− 2
√
H]− 4H√L[(1− λ)[√λ(RL− cL)− 2
√
L]
−4HL(1− λ)2 − 4HL(1− λ)λ
= 4
√
L
√
H[(1− λ)√λ[√L(RH − cH)−
√
H(RL− cL) > 0
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First inequality follows form the fact that
L[
√
λ(RH − cH)− 2
√
H]2 > H[
√
λ(RL− cL)− 2
√
L]2 .
The second inequality follows from the fact that
H
cH
> L
cL
.
Hence ∆−λ(cH−cL)2 > 0 and sign{(cH−cL)
√
λ−√∆} < 0 so that asH < aoH
psH − poH = (RH+cL)
√
λ+
√
∆
2
√
λ
− (RH+cH)
2
psH − poH =
√
∆−(cH−cL)
√
λ
2
√
λ
In fact, we have just shown that
sign{√∆− (cH − cL)
√
λ} > 0
Hence, psH > p
o
H .
Proof of Corollary ??:
(i) If λ ∈ (λK , 1], the separating equilibrium advertising level is
asH =
[
√
λ(RH−cL)−2
√
H]−√∆
2
√
H
asH =
√
λ
[ (RH−cL)
2
√
H
−
√
[(RH−cL)
√
L−(RL−cL)
√
H][(RH−cL)
√
L+(RL−cL)
√
H−4√λ√H√L]
2
√
H
√
L
]− 1
dasH
dλ
= λ
−0.5
2
[ (RH−cL)
2
√
H
−
√
[(RH−cL)
√
L−(RL−cL)
√
H][(RH−cL)
√
L+(RL−cL)
√
H−4√λ√H√L]
2
√
H
√
L
]
+
√
λ
[− [((RH−cL)√L−(RL−cL)√H)((RH−cL)√L+(RL−cL)√H−4√λ√H√L)]−0.5
2
√
H
√
L
(−2λ−0.5√H√L
2
√
H
√
L
)]
> 0
dasH
dλ
> 0
(ii) If λ ∈ (λK , 1], asH − asL can be written as follows
asH − aoL =
[
√
λ(RH − cL)− 2
√
H]−√∆− 2√HaoL
2
√
H
=
A−B −√∆
2
√
H
where A =
√
λ(RH − cL)− 2
√
H and B = 2
√
HaoL.
Now, the task is to write down ∆ in terms of A and B.
∆ = [
√
λ(RH − cL)− 2
√
H]2 + 4
√
H[(1− λ)[
√
λ(RH − cL)− 2
√
H]−
√
H(1− λ+ aoL)2 − (1− λ)λ
√
H]
∆ = [
√
λ(RH − cL)− 2
√
H]2 + 4
√
H[(1− λ)
√
λ(RH − cL)− 4H[(aoL)2 + 2(1− λ)aoL + 2(1− λ)]]
We also know that aoL =
(RL−cL)
√
λ−2√L
2
√
L
⇔ A = (RL− cL)− 2
√
L
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∆ = A2 + 4
√
H(1− λ)[A+ 2√H]− 4H[(aoL)2 + 2(1− λ)aL] + 8H(1− λ)]
= A2 + 4
√
H(1− λ)A− 4H[(aoL)2 + 2(1− λ)aoL]
= [A+ 2
√
H(1− λ)]2 − 4H(1− λ)2 − 4H[aL + (1− λ)]2 + 4H(1− λ)2
= [A+ 2
√
H(1− λ)]2 − [2√HaL + 2
√
H(1− λ)]2
= [A+ 2
√
H(1− λ)]2 − [B + 2√H(1− λ)]2 = (A−B)[A+B + 4√H(1− λ)]
∆ = (A−B)[A+B + 4
√
H(1− λ)]
Now, let’s go back to our original problem and substitute for ∆
asH − aoL = A−B−
√
∆
2
√
H
asH − aoL = A−B−
√
(A−B)[A+B+4√H(1−λ)]
2
√
H
=
√
A−B
[√
A−B−
√
A+B+4
√
H(1−λ)
]
2
√
H
< 0
Proof of Proposition ??
Let’s first calculate the high quality firm’s profit in the separating equilibrium
If λ ∈ (λL, 1], then (psH , asH) = ( (RH+cL)
√
λ+
√
∆
2
√
λ
, [(RH−cL)
√
λ−2√H]−√∆
2
√
H
) and
ΠH(p
s
H , a
s
H ; 1) =
[(RH−cL)
√
λ−√∆−2√Hλ][(RH+cL−2cH)
√
λ+
√
∆]−2√Hλ[(RH−cL)
√
λ−√∆−2√H]
4Hλ
where ∆ = λ[(RH−cL)
√
L−(RL−cL)
√
H][(RH−cL)
√
L+(RL−cL)
√
H−4√λ√H√L]
L
And the H-quality firm’s profit is in case of deviation from the separating equi-
librium
maxp,aΠH(p, a; 0) =
(RL−cH)2−4
√
L
√
λ(RL−cH)+4L
4L
The separating equilibrium exists if the H-quality prefers the separating equi-
librium pair to any other pair where consumer mistakenly believes that it is of a
low quality firm.
ΠH(p
s
H , a
s
H ; 1) > max
p,a
ΠH(p, a; 0)
ΠH(p
s
H , a
s
H ; 1)−max
p,a
ΠH(p, a; 0) > 0
[(RH−cL)
√
λ−√∆−2√Hλ][(RH+cL−2cH)
√
λ+
√
∆]−2√Hλ[(RH−cL)
√
λ−√∆−2√H]
4Hλ
− (RL−cH)2−4
√
L
√
λ(RL−cH)+4L
4L
> 0
After some algebra, the inequality reduces to the following;
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ΠH(psH , a
s
H ; 1)−maxΠH(p, a; 0) =
(cH−cL)λ[2L(
√
∆√
λ
+λcL+2
√
H
√
λ)−H(cH+cL+4
√
L
√
λ)]
16LHλ > 0
The increasing marginal cost assumption (i.e., cH > cL) is necessary for the exis-
tence. The following part of the last inequality determines the conditions under
which the separating equilibrium exists.
[2L(
√
∆√
λ
+ λcL + 2
√
H
√
λ)−H(cH + cL + 4
√
L
√
λ)] > 0
⇐⇒
2L
√
∆√
λ
> H(cH + cL + 4
√
L
√
λ)− 2L(λcL + 2
√
H
√
λ)
Let’s take the square of both sides
2L2∆
λ
> [H(cH + cL + 4
√
L
√
λ)− 2L(λcL + 2
√
H
√
λ)]2
Now substitute ∆ = λ[(R
2LH−cL2)(H−L)−4
√
λLH(R
√
LH−cL)(
√
H−√L)]
L
into the equa-
tion;
4L(R2LH− cL2)(H−L) > [H(cH + cL+4
√
L
√
λ)−2L(λcL+2
√
H
√
λ)]2+16L
√
λLH(R
√
LH− cL)(
√
H−√L)
This inequality is satisfied if (i) (H-L) is not too small and (2) R is not
too small.
Let’s now calculate the high quality firm’s profit at the proposed separating
equilibrium (psH , a
s
H) = (p, 0) when λ ∈ [0, λL]
ΠH(p
s
H , a
s
H ; 1) = ΠH(p, 0; 1) = (1− λ)(R−
p
H
)(p− cH)
= (1− λ)((RL− cL)
2
4L
− (RH − p)(cH − cL)
H
)
The following is the high quality firm’s profit when it deviates from the separating
equilibrium. Realize that the high quality firm would not advertise in case of
deviation because λ ∈ [0, λL] i.e., even the low quality firm with lower marginal
cost does not advertise.
maxpΠH(p, 0; 0) = maxp(1− λ)(R− pL)(p− cH) = (1− λ) (RL−cH)
2
4L
The separating equilibrium exists if the the following condition is satisfied;
ΠH(p
s
H , a
s
H ; 1) = (1− λ)( (RL−cL)
2
4L
− (RH−p)(cH−cL)
H
) > maxpΠH(p, 0; 0) = (1− λ) (RL−cH)24L
(cH−cL)[H(2RL−cL−cH)−4L(RH−p)]
4LH
> 0
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In what follows, we show that the following equation is satisfied if (i) (H-L) is not
too small and (2) R is not too small.
sign{H(2RL− cL − cH)− 4L(RH − p)} > 0
Let’s substitute p = RH+cL
2
+
√
(R2HL−cL2)(H−L)
4L
into the last equation.
sign{−HcH −HcL + 2LcL + 2
√
L
√
(R2HL− c2L)(H − L)}
sign{2√L√(R2HL− c2L)(H − L)− [H(cH + cL)− 2LcL]}
Let’s multiply the last equation with the following positive equation
2
√
L
√
(R2HL− c2L)(H − L) + [H(cH + cL)− 2LcL]
Then the inequality turns out to be;
sign{4L(R2HL− c2L)(H − L)− [H(cH + cL)− 2LcL]2}
After some algebra, this equality reduces to the following;
sign{[2R√HL√H − L]2 − [H(cH + cL)]2}
sign{[2R√HL√H − L−H(cH + cL)][2R
√
HL
√
H − L+H(cH + cL)]}
Finally, the separating equilibrium(psH , a
s
H) = (p, 0) exists if
sign{2R√HL√H − L−H(cH + cL)} > 0
This inequality holds if (i)(H-L) is not too small (ii) R is not too small.
Finally, if λ ∈ [λL, λK ], then (psH , asH) = (RH+cL+
√
∆1
2
, 0) and ΠH(p
s
H , a
s
H) =
(1 − λ)(R − psH
H
)(psH − cH). In case of deviation, we have specified the off-the-
equilibrium path beliefs such that consumers believe it is of low quality. In what
follows, we describe the deviation profit of high quality
ΠH(p, a; 0) = (1− λ) + λ a1+a(R− pL)(p− cH)− a
(pLH , a
L
H) = (
RL+cH
2
,
√
λ(RL−cH)−2
√
L
2
√
L
) .
With λ ∈ [λL, λK ], there are two separate cases: (i)asH = 0 < aLH < aoL and
(ii)aLH = a
s
H = 0 < a
o
L
Case(i): The H-quality firm’s deviation advertising is positive, i.e. asH = 0 <
aLH =
√
λ(RL−cH)−2
√
L
2
√
L
< aoL. Hence, the following inequality ΠH(p
s
H , a
s
H ; 1) >
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ΠH(p
L
H , a
L
H ; 0) where
ΠH(p
s
H , a
s
H ; 1) = (1− λ)(R−
psH
H
)(psH − cH)
= (1− λ)(R− RH + cL +
√
∆1
2H
)(
RH + cL +
√
∆1
2
− cH)
ΠH(p
L
H , a
L
H ; 0) =
(RL−cH)2−4
√
L
√
λ(RL−cH)+4L
4L
After some algebra, the inequality reduces to
(cH − cL)[2RL− cL − cH − 4
√
L
√
λ− (1− λ)(RH − cL −
√
∆1)] ≥ 0
Case(ii): By using the previous case where λ ∈ [0, λL], it is easy to show that
p > psH > p
L
H . The following is the incentive compatibility condition for H-quality
firm
ΠH(p
s
H , a
s
H) = (1− λ)(R−
psH
H
)(psH − cH)
> (1− λ)(R− p
H
)(p− cH)
> Π(pLH , a
L
H ; 0) = (1− λ)
(RL− cH)2
4L
However, this is the same inequality with the case where λ ∈ [0, λL]; hence, the
separating equilibrium exists if (i)(H-L) is not too small (ii) R is not too small.
No pooling equilibrium:
The proof is similar to Bagwell (2005). Before destabilization of pooling equilibria,
we first introduce the method by Bagwell and Ramey (1988). Let’s define the
demand of any firm when the initial prior of being high-quality is ρ0
D(p, a; ρ0) = λ
a
1+a
(R− p
ρ0H+(1−ρ0)L) + (1− λ)(R−
p
ρ0H+(1−ρ0)L)
Let’s define the following heuristic payoff function
Π˜(p, a; c, ρ) = (p− c)D(p, a; ρ)− a
where ρ represents the probability that the firm is of high quality. In fact, there
are only two marginal cost levels: cL and cH while Π˜(p, a; c) is heuristic payoff
function with marginal costs c and demand D(p, a; 1). Let’s assume that for any
given c, there exists a unique p(c) and a(c) that maximizes the payoff function
which is concave in both p and a.
γ(c) = (p(c), a(c)) =argmax
p,a
Π˜(p, a; c, 1)
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As a special case, γ(cH) = (p
o
H(cH), a
o
H(cH)) where p
o
H and a
o
H are observable qual-
ity price and advertising spending of a high-quality firm respectively. Furthermore,
let’s assume that, there exists c > cL and cL > c with the boundary condition that
max{ΠL(γ(c); 1),ΠL(γ(c); 1)} < ΠoL = ˜Π(γ(cL))
In a candidate pure strategy pooling equilibrium such as (p˜, a˜), let’s assume
that both type of firms play this strategy with probability one and all exposed
consumers believe that the firm is indeed a high-quality with probability ρ0. In
our case, under the condition that cL < cH and the low-quality firm is indifferent,
demand reducing changes shall make the high-quality better off as we have shown
before. With cL < cH and the boundary conditions , there exists c˙ > cL that gives
the following Indifference equality
(p˜− cL)D(p˜, a˜; ρ0)− a˜− (p(c˙)− cL)D(p(c˙), a(c˙); 1) + a(c˙) = 0
Here, there might be a c¨ < cL that satisfies the last equality but we prefer c˙ since
it induces a profitable deviation by decreasing the demand for the high-quality
firm while c¨ does the opposite. In order to destabilize the candidate pooling
equilibrium all we need is another pair of price and advertising in which high-
quality firm becomes better off while low-quality firm is indifferent(Cho and Kreps
(1987) refinement).
We also have the following inequality by construction
(p(c˙)− c˙)D(p(c˙), a(c˙); 1)− a(c˙)− (p˜− c˙)D(p˜, a˜; ρ0) + a˜ > 0
By adding up last two equation, We drive the following inequality
(c˙− cL)[D(p˜, a˜; ρ0)−D(p(c˙), a(c˙); 1)] > 0
Hence, it is a fact that D(p˜, a˜; ρ0) > D(p(c˙), a(c˙); 1) since c˙ > cL
The next step is to show that this pair of strategies (p(c˙), a(c˙)) makes the
high-quality firm better off compared to pooling strategy (p˜, a˜). The sign of the
following equation determines whether deviation would be profitable for the high-
quality firm;
(p˜− cH)D(p˜, a˜; ρ0)− a˜− (p(c˙)− cH)D(p(c˙), a(c˙); 1) + a(c˙)
Now, subtract the indifference equation to get
(cL − cH)[D(p˜, a˜; ρ0)−D(p(c˙), a(c˙); 1)] < 0
Therefore, the high-quality firm has incentive to deviate from the candidate
pooling equilibrium pair (p˜, a˜) to the pair (p(c˙), a(c˙)) and also consumers correctly
believes that this deviation is an act of high quality firm with Cho and Kreps
(1987). So, no pooling equilibria can survive under Cho and Kreps refinement.
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Proof of Proposition ??
The incentive compatibility condition of the low quality firm (ICL)is
ΠL(p, a; 1) = λ
a
1 + a
(R− p
H
)(p− cL) + (1− λ)(R− p
L
)(p− cL)− a ≤ ΠoL.
If the ICL is satisfied for the pair (p
o
H , a
o
H), the high quality firm prefers setting
(poH , a
o
H) to maximize its payoff for any value λ ∈ [0, 1]. We characterize the
properties of the (psiH , a
si
H) in three steps.
In the first step, we argue that at λ = 1, aforementioned maximization problem
of the high quality firm perfectly coincides with the maximization problem in
Section 3. When all consumers are unaware of the product (i.e., λ = 1), the
fraction of aware consumers is zero so that whether aware consumers have the
knowledge of product quality does not matter. Therefore, we conclude that the
solutions at λ = 1 have following properties: asiH < a
o
L < a
o
H and p
si
H > p
o
H > p
o
L.
In the second step, we show that ΠoL (i.e., the RHS of ICL ) is decreasing in λ
and ΠL(p
o
H , a
o
H ; 1) (i.e., the LHS of ICL) is increasing in λ. The optimal observable
quality profit for the low quality firm is
ΠoL =

(RL−2√L−cL)2
4L
+ (1−
√
λ)(RL−cL)√
L
if λ ∈ (λL, 1]
(RL−cL)2
4L
if λ ∈ [0, λL]
.
It is easy to show that if λ ∈ (λL, 1], then
dΠoL
dλ
= −1
2
λ−
1
2
RL− cL√
L
< 0
and
d2ΠoL
dλ2
=
1
4
λ−
3
2
RL− cL√
L
> 0.
Thus, ΠoL is decreasing and convex in λ. Similarly,
ΠL(p
o
H , a
o
H ; 1) = (λ(RH − cH)− 2
√
λ
√
H)(
RH + cH − 2cL
4H
)
+(1− λ)(R(2L−H)− cH)(RH+cH−2cL4L )
dΠL(p
o
H , a
o
H ; 1)
dλ
= ((RH − cH)− λ− 12
√
H)(
RH + cH − 2cL
4H
)− (R(2L−H)− cH)(RH + cH − 2cL
4L
)
After some simplification, this equality reduces to the following
dΠL(p
o
H , a
o
H ; 1)
dλ
= (
H − L
L
)(
HR + cH√
H
)− λ− 12
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At λ = 1,
dΠL(p
o
H ,a
o
H ;1)
dλ
> 0. Moreover, the
dΠL(p
o
H ,a
o
H ;1)
dλ
takes the value of zero at
λ∗ =
[
1
(H−L
L
)(HR+cH√
H
)
]2
It is also easy to show that
d2ΠL(p
o
H , a
o
H ; 1)
dλ2
> 0
Hence, if λ ∈ (λ∗, 1], ΠL(poH , aoH ; 1) is increasing and convex in λ. To be able
to argue that ΠL(p
o
H , a
o
H ; 1) decreasing in whole region of λ ∈ [λH , 1], we need to
show that the value λ∗ is less than λH .
λH = (
2
√
H
RH − cH )
2 > λ∗ =
[
1
(H−L
L
)(RH+cH√
H
)
]2
⇐⇒[
2
√
H
RH − cH
]
>
[
1
(H−L
L
)(RH+cH√
H
)
]
⇐⇒
2(
H − L
L
)(HR + cH) > (RH − cH)
Thus, λ∗ is always smaller than λH .
In the third step, we argue that (i) at λ = 1, ΠoL (i.e., the RHS of ICL ) is
less than ΠL(p
o
H , a
o
H ; 1) (i.e., the LHS of ICL) (ii) at λ = λH , Π
o
L is bigger than
ΠL(p
o
H , a
o
H ; 1). At λ = 1, the maximization problem in section 3 coincides with the
one we are analyzing here. From Lemma 2, it is the case that ΠL(p
o
H , a
o
H ; 1) > Π
o
L
at λ = 1. To show part (ii), remember that if λ ≤ λH , then aoH = aoL = 0. By
definition of poL, the following inequality is always satisfied at λ = λH
ΠL(p
o
H , 0; 1) = (1− λ)(R−
poH
L
)(poH − cL) < ΠoL = (1− λ)(R−
poL
L
)(poL − cL)
Now, by combining step two and three, we can conclude that there exists a
unique λI such that
ΠL(p
o
H , a
o
H ; 1) < Π
o
L if λ ∈ [0, λI)
ΠL(p
o
H , a
o
H ; 1) = Π
o
L if λ = λI
ΠL(p
o
H , a
o
H ; 1) > Π
o
L if λ ∈ (λI , 1]
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Thus, the high quality firm has to distort price and advertising from (poH , a
o
H) if
λ ∈ (λI , 1]. For all other values of λ, it sets its optimal observable price and
advertising (poH , a
o
H) and there is no distortion.
Now, from second step, we know that ΠoL − ΠL(poH , aoH ; 1) is maximized at
λ = 1 and decreases as λ decreases. Basically, the distortion in both price and
advertising is highest when there is no informed consumer. Over time, as the frac-
tion of informed consumers increases, the distortion in both price and advertising
decreases.
Proof of Proposition ??
The nice property of the solution pair (psiH , a
si
H) is that the distortion decreases as
λ decreases. In other words, if one can find the conditions under which
ΠH(p
si
H , a
si
H ; 1) > max
p,a
ΠH(p, a; 0)
at λ = 1. Then, as the fraction of informed consumers increases, distortion de-
creases and ΠH(p
si
H , a
si
H ; 1) increases. As a result, the existence is satisfied for all
other values of λ under the same conditions. However, the conditions under which
this inequality is satisfied at λ = 1 is already characterized in Section 3. The
separating equilibrium (psiH , a
si
H) exists if (i) (H-L) is not too small (ii) R is not too
small.
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